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Abstract 
Behind the prominent Brand names and Retail stores of global supply chains are 
intermediaries who provide services to large volume buyers. A key feature of the global apparel 
industry is complex supply chains with many contractors and subcontractors and intense 
competition among factories – induced by the buyers – to reduce cost and increase speed. Over 
the past two decades, scholars have noted the dramatic increase of market power of international 
retail corporations gained at the expense of the fragmentation of centers of production. Enter Li 
& Fung, a Hong Kong based firm which is the largest sourcing agent in the global apparel 
business. Li & Fung’s central role in shaping the supply chain of apparel potentially affects the 
lives of millions of workers in their direct supply chains and the labor markets in which they are 
such a commanding force. Their strategy of sourcing emphasizes the cutthroat competition 
among factories that is the source of apparel workers’ conditions. Our analysis also indicates that 
already an “unseen giant” Li & Fung appears to have decided to move towards higher value-
added processes in the supply chain. Understanding the complex implications of Li & Fung’s 
business strategy for workers’ rights is crucial for securing decent conditions for workers in the 
apparel industry over the coming years. 
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Strategic Overview 
Li & Fung works with its customers to design, develop, source, and distribute products 
which are then sold in over 40 markets worldwide (Li & Fung Annual Report 2014b). Some of 
Li & Fung’s notable clients include Walmart, Sears, Target, Juicy Couture, Lucky Brand Jeans, 
Quiksilver, Calvin Klein, Coach, Hudson’s Bay, Tommy Hilfiger, DKNY Jeans, Kate Spade, 
American Eagle, Aéropostale, and Sean John (Birchall and Mitchell 2010). In 2013, Li & Fung 
Ltd. employed 28,210 individuals in over 300 offices and distribution centers worldwide: 4,153 
employees in Hong Kong, 9,428 in the Chinese Mainland, and 14,629 abroad. Li & Fung 
maintains access to a network of over 15,000 suppliers from which it sources products for its 
customers (Li & Fung Annual Report 2013). An additional 18,000 employees (for a total of 45, 
800) were employed in other divisions of the Fung Group (Fung Group 2014a). Compare Li and 
Fung’s revenue of $20.7 billion to Nike $27.8 billion, and H&M (the world’s second largest 
clothing retailer) $19.1 billion2.  
Before the Great Recession, Li and Fung had apparently decided upon the strategic 
objective of moving up the value chain, buying brands, entering the US market with its own 
signature.  The Recession did not treat this plan tenderly.  As of its 2013 Annual Report (p. 13-
14) 62% of Li and Fung profit is still located in its sourcing business; and indeed, it has an entire 
business unit (DSG) which is dedicated to Wal-Mart business – in 2012 Bloomberg reported this 
at $2 billion in revenue – roughly ten percent of Li and Fung’s business (Wong and Longid 
2012).  
In July 2014 Li and Fung spun off its Global Brands division as a separate corporation 
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with $1.3 billion in revenue and the owner or controller of 250 globally recognized brands in 
particular situations, including: 
Quiksilver, UnderArmour, Disney, and Calvin Klein, which we 
license the intellectual property from the brand owners or licensors 
for use in select product categories and geographies. … and 
Controlled Brands:…such as Frye and Juicy Couture, which we 
either own or control the intellectual property under a long-term 
license, giving us control over development and marketing. 
(Global Brands Group 2014a) 
 
Returning to its core sourcing business, and its overall strategy of production, Li and 
Fung’s leadership has articulated a particular sourcing strategy which is poignantly relevant to 
stakeholders concerned with working conditions and labor rights. Victor Fung – who heads the 
Li and Fung empire – calls this a strategy of dispersion (Fung 2011).  
 
History 
Li & Fung was founded in 1906 China by Fung Pak-liu and Li To-ming (Li & Fung 
2014a). In 1937, the company relocated from Guangzhou China to Hong Kong and formally 
became a company. After the Second World War, Li To-ming sold his portion of Li & Fung to 
the Fung family. The company underwent a number of changes throughout the years, shifting 
from public stock ownership to private ownership, then ultimately back to publicly listed 
ownership in 1973. In 1988, the company conducted a management buyout within the Fung 
Family and changed the functions of the company, allowing it to focus on export trading and 
retail. During the wave of globalization in the 1990s, Li & Fung expanded their business past 
Southeast Asia to the rest of the world.  
Li & Fung’s past and present business model does not include the ownership of any 
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means of production.3 Rather, as a global sourcing and supply chain management firm, their 
expertise includes “product design and development, raw material and factory sourcing, 
production planning and management, quality assurance and export documentation to shipping 
consolidation.” (Li & Fung Annual Report 2004).  
 
Geographic and Industrial Focus 
Headquartered in Hong Kong, the United States comprised 62% of Li & Fung’s exports 
in 2013. The main focus of Li & Fung’s Distribution Network in US operations has been cost 
reduction while strengthening their relationships with client brands, enhancing their portfolio of 
licensed brands, and improving their management and design of controlled brands (Li & Fung   
Annual Report 2013). Costs of Li & Fung’s US operating group under their distribution network 
decreased by 14% over 2013 and all operating groups combined resulted in a profit of US $296 
million dollars, compared to a loss of US $39 million in 2012. Li & Fung’s business in Europe 
accounted for 24% of turnover,4 with a focus in the United Kingdom and Germany (Li & Fung   
Annual Report 2013).  The spin-off of Global Brands, in mid-year 2014 creates an entity with 
short term cash losses, but – from their point of view – the possibility of long term appreciation. 
If their US market penetration and cost management is successful they can become a rich market 
brand manager, not just a sourcing agent.  
The domestic Chinese market only accounted for 5% of Li & Fung’s total revenue in 
2013, but with the emergence of a Chinese middle class, Li & Fung has been creating “operating 
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groups” to increase their presence in China and Asia.5 Li & Fung’s business in Asia accounted 
for 12% of turnover in 2013, and consistent with their focus on increasing a regional presence, 
they have concentrated on adding new contracts in Asia (Li & Fung Annual Report 2013). 
As of 2013, 69% of Li & Fung’s total sales were of soft goods and 31% were hard goods, 
with “services” making up 1%. With regards to Li & Fung, “soft goods” refers to apparel, while 
“hard goods” refers to toys, furniture, home goods, cosmetics, etc (Hoovers 2014). 
 
Structure 
Over the past century, Li & Fung has evolved into a complex global conglomerate of 
businesses under the auspices of the publicly-traded Fung Group. A privately held entity, Fung 
Holdings (1937), is its primary shareholder. Trading, logistics, and distribution functions are 
contained within Li & Fung, which is publicly listed on the SEHK. Retailing operations are 
controlled by Fung Retailing, a privately held company which owns six major subsidiaries, two 
publicly traded (Convenience Retail Asia and Trinity) and four privately held (Branded Lifestyle 
Holdings, Fung Kids (Holdings), Toys “R” Us (Asia), Suhyang Networks, UCCAL Fashion 
Group). This is represented by the graphic below: 
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 The five Li & Fung operating groups are LF Sourcing, LF Beauty, DSG, LF Fashion, and LF Products.  
LF Sourcing is specifically focuses on business for apparel and hard goods, while sourcing for the 
Group’s distribution business (Li & Fung Limited Annual Report 2013). 
Figure 1: Business Structure of the Fung Group (Fung Group 2014
Following a period of heavy acquisiti
Fung Group made the decisions to create a spinoff of Li & Fung, called Global Brands Group, 
Global Brands will handle Li & Fung’s licensing and branding operations as a publicly
company - a separate entity from Li & Fung, but controlled within Fung Holdings (1937). (Chu 
and Ng 2014; Chan 2014). In July of 2014, Global Brands was spun
entity, with former Li & Fung CEO Bruce Rockowitz as its CEO. He was succeeded as 
Fung CEO by Spencer Fung. The business press does not note whether this was a demotion for 
Rockowitz (considering the difficult results of the Recession years’ financials
the importance of Global Brands to Li and Fung strategy. 
ons between 2009 and 2011, executives within the 
-off as a separately listed 
), or an elevation of 
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Recent Awards and Recognitions 
Li & Fung has received many accolades for corporate governance and performance. In 
2013 alone, Li & Fung received the following: an award for being one of the “World’s Most 
Admired” companies from Fortune, “Corporate Governance Asia Recognition Award 2013--
Asia’s Icon on Corporate Governance” from Corporate Governance Asia Journal, and “The 
Asset Corporate Platinum Award 2013” for all around excellence from The Asset (Li & Fung   
Annual Report 2013). Li & Fung was also ranked as number 716 in Forbes “Global 2000” 
companies (an increase from being ranked 808th in 2011) and Bruce Rockowitz was ranked as 
4th in “Asian Corporate Director Recognition Awards 2013” by Corporate Governance Asia 
Journal (Li & Fung Annual Report 2013). Other recognitions in the last three years relate to 
investing skills, corporate governance, world’s most admired companies, one of the most 
influential Asian companies, and best CSR, CFO and CEO excellence awards to Bruce 
Rockowitz, Ed Lam and William Fung. 
 
Recent Financial History and Business Strategy 
Recession Sourcing Deals and Acquisitions 
The 2008 recession initiated the change in Li and Fung strategy; pre-recession Li & Fung   
looks very different from today’s firm. In the midst of the Great Recession, Li & Fung began 
making investments and acquisitions and actively sought to diversify their business.  
A series of highly-lucrative sourcing deals with new business partners were part of this 
strategy. Sourcing agreements reached with Talbots (The Patriot Ledger 2009) and Liz Claiborne 
(Talley 2009) were among the first indicators of Li & Fung’s move towards high-end apparel; 
both deals were reached in 2009. Prior to this, Li & Fung had specialized in low-quality, low-
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cost apparel (Davies 2013). While high demand for low-cost apparel meant success for a 
substantial period of growth, their move towards higher-end goods was aimed at long-term 
profitability in a post-recession market. Agreements with retailers like Talbots and Liz Claiborne 
meant that coming out of the recession, Li & Fung would have its foot in the door to access 
larger portions of the retailers’ profits.  
An agreement in 2010 with UK-based apparel retailer French Connection worth US $10 
million further diversified their sourcing deals (O’Doherty 2010). This is part of a trend towards 
sourcing deals with more internationally-minded retailers and wholesalers, especially in the case 
of French Connection, which has retail operations in multiple countries, including the United 
States (O’Doherty 2010). Also in 2010, Li & Fung secured an agreement with Walmart that 
would be worth at least US$2 billion per year (Birchall and Mitchell 2010), and another deal 
with Sears worth US$10 million. While these do not correspond with either a more upscale or 
international business model in sourcing operations, they firmed up the status quo for Li & Fung   
in high-volume, low-quality orders that tend to make up the core of Li & Fung’s business. 
Generally, these recent sourcing deals indicate a threefold approach: 1) Continue to secure and 
maintain high-value sourcing deals with larger retailers, 2) Seek out new sourcing opportunities 
with international retailers, and 3) Seek out new sourcing opportunities with high-quality goods 
retailers. 
Li & Fung has taken a similar approach regarding acquisitions. In mid-2010, Li & Fung   
completed a series of seven acquisitions worth US$140 million (South China Morning Post 
2010). Two of the acquisitions were of Hong Kong-based companies; Jackel Group, which 
supplies “fragrance and personal care products”, and HTP Group, a designer of denim (South 
China Morning Post 2010). The two other acquisitions were of Cipriani Accessories and Max 
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Leather Group, both companies that design, distribute, and import men’s and women’s 
accessories, with operations in multiple countries, including the United States, Mexico, and 
Canada. By completing acquisitions of multinational companies such as these, Li & Fung is 
moving closer to being a brand/jobber rather than merely a sourcing agent  
In 2010, managing director of Li & Fung, William Fung, made comments about recent 
acquisitions in the cosmetics sector, revealing his goal to reach US$1 billion in core operating 
profit and to turn over more than US$20 billion (Tsang 2010). A larger move into cosmetics 
would be relatively new, but lucrative territory for Li & Fung. A separate acquisition of producer 
Jimlar in late 2010 meant that Li & Fung would oversee production for luxury brands Coach and 
Calvin Klein, as Jimlar had been responsible for supplying many of their goods (The Toronto 
Star 2010). Li & Fung’s later purchase of Visage, a European producer-brand, marked the 
beginning of a series of other acquisitions in Europe, worth at least US$170 million (The Journal 
2010).  
The acquisitions of Jimlar and Visage were critical; the two companies do much of the 
same work as Li & Fung. Specifically, Visage and its clothing sourcing operation stand out 
because of Visage’s business model, which includes the branding of its own sourced products for 
its customers, if a customer deems Visage branding appropriate (Visage 2011). Essentially, 
Visage maintains sourcing operations as its core business, but brands the products that it sources 
from its manufacturers if a retailer opts for such a product. Later, Li & Fung completed an 
acquisitions deal worth nearly US$1 billion where it purchased IDS, a firm that had handled 
logistics for production and distribution operations for Li & Fung (Wong 2010). The deal meant 
that Li & Fung had full control of these operations in-house, as opposed to contracting the work 
as it had been doing prior to the August acquisition. While this move may seem out of step with 
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other acquisitions which reached toward higher-end retail profits, purchasing IDS may have been 
the best option to support their low-cost sourcing deals, which remain the core of Li & Fung’s 
business. Like Li & Fung’s sourcing deals reached in 2010, their acquisitions were congruent 
with the same threefold approach they took with those sourcing agreements. 
 
New Models 
The series of acquisitions made in 2010 were even more aggressive than the sourcing 
agreements reached over the same year. While they indicate a new move toward higher-quality 
goods in international markets, the fact that these are acquisitions rather than sourcing 
agreements is indicative of some underlying motivation of Li & Fung. Two things to consider 
here are: 1) the benefits that Li & Fung receives from acquiring as opposed to “only” reaching a 
sourcing agreement and 2) the manner in which Li & Fung raised the capital to complete the 
aforementioned acquisitions. While benefits from acquisitions can only be quantified over a 
longer period of time, it is the case that Li & Fung took a new and deliberate, much more 
proactive approach to acquisitions. (Wong and Wang 2009, Wang 2009). The manner in which 
Li & Fung was able to make these acquisitions, then, is especially relevant. The firm sold 30% of 
the company’s stock (Lee 2009) to fund some of its new acquisitions. This, in addition to lines of 
bank credit meant that Li & Fung was prepared to make acquisitions worth more than US$1 
billion (Chen 2009). This signaled a move away from the status-quo of a sourcing-deal-centric 
business model. While sourcing agreements had previously formed the core of Li & Fung’s 
business, their commitment to making these new acquisitions suggests the future of a Li & Fung 
that aspires to recoup the margins of brand ownership.  
The addition of Global Brands Group to the Fung Group family, includes the major 
suppliers Jimlar, Visage, and Trinity. These suppliers’ customers include Calvin Klein, Coach, 
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and other similar brands. The separation of the licensing and branding functions that were once 
the responsibility of Li & Fung is intended to refocus Li & Fung on its core business of trading, 
logistics, and distribution, and allows Global Brands Group to focus on the newer and “riskier” 
licensing and branding operations (Chan 2014). This, perhaps, is to address investor insecurity, 
reflected in Li & Fung’s stock price. Over the two years after the major sell-off that funded 
acquisitions, share prices rose dramatically and peaked at US$50, perhaps fueled by speculation 
of Li & Fung’s new business strategy. Now, shares trade at under US$12 (Google Finance 2014). 
This is despite the fact that total net income has risen steadily, at just over 21% growth in the last 
year (although revenue has not seen significant increases in recent years). 
 
Li & Fung’s Corporate Social Responsibility 
Public CSR Philosophy 
The central focus of Li & Fung’s self-articulated Corporate Social Responsibility is 
sustainability and managing environmental impact, with lesser priority given to social and 
economic development. The stated goal of their CSR program is to “improve social, 
environmental and economic conditions in our supply chain, reduce the environmental footprint 
of our own operations, enhance the health and well-being of our colleagues, and contribute to the 
sustainable development of the diverse communities where we operate” (Li & Fung 2014c). Li & 
Fung seems to have many more initiatives aimed towards sustainability than social well-being, 
and Li & Fung is one of the few corporations which reports their carbon emissions.  (This carbon 
emission reporting makes Li & Fung appear to pollute less than other large corporations, but this 
may be misleading because they do not own their own means of production and it is unclear 
whether shipping of goods is accounted for, so their carbon emissions would naturally be lower.) 
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Recognition of Pressures Inherent in Sourcing Dynamics 
Regarding human rights and factory conditions, Fung commented on the constant friction 
between brands and Li & Fung as a sourcing company because brands are always looking for 
cheaper and faster products. Fung said “[t]here are conflicting requirements and top management 
has to reinforce the message that no matter how great the pressure, there are certain standards 
that are non-negotiable—or else the buyers try to get around them” (Sharett 2002). He 
highlighted that more licensing of products decreases brand responsibility: “Most people have 
not confronted the fact that this is still their brand, even though the licensee makes it, and they 
are still responsible for the conditions in which those products are made. You have to extend the 
control over your brand” (Sharett 2002).  
On other occasions, William Fung made favorable comments  about the raising of 
minimum wages, as it would improve efficiency of the business, “[i]t is not just a matter of us 
trying to look good and do the right thing” (Edwards 2014). This statement from Fung reinforces 
similar statements from other executives. Bruce Rockowitz – at the time CEO of the core Fung 
Ltd. – publicly recognized that it is in the best interest of companies to improve conditions of 
factories because negative pressure from consumers has the potential to affect sales. Li & Fung’s 
top management seem to believe that consumer awareness and demand for social responsibility 
will lead to a better industry.  
Li & Fung has recently added Vendor Support Services to their business, which includes 
the monitoring of factories. This move has been criticized by activist groups such as the Clean 
Clothes Campaign, which states “a consultancy approach takes little to no responsibility for the 
role Li & Fung has to play in the safety issues at the factories they source from” (Chu 2014). The 
effect of this new program on workers remains to be seen. As middlemen in the industry, Li & 
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Fung recognizes the benefit of CSR to their business, which both suppliers and brands demand. 
Having better CSR than their competitors is a strategy to differentiate their services. However, Li 
& Fung   is in a position where they are constantly pressured by brands to lower their sourcing 
prices. Fung may lament these pressures, but their sourcing strategy is based on lower costs from 
factories, which directly imply lower wages and less rigorous health and safety standards.    
 
CSR Initiatives  
Although the core of Li & Fung’s CSR work is related to protecting the environment, 
from analysis of media articles over the past six years, it appears that Li & Fung   has increased 
their participation in CSR programs aimed towards increasing their reputation as a socially 
responsible company. They participate in programs focusing both on their employees and the 
broader community, such increasing women’s involvement in management positions in the trade 
sector and giving their employees optional days off in order to volunteer in the community. 
Li & Fung participates in a USAID's Women in Trade initiative in order to increase 
women’s participation in trade companies. This program is a response to “a USAID-funded 
study showed that women comprise less than 10 percent of management and 20 percent of junior 
staff in trade companies” (The Balochistan Times 2013). Li & Fung is one of fifteen companies 
that participate in the Women in Trade initiative that provided seventeen recent Pakistani 
graduates internships in the trade sector. Among the companies participating are TARGET 
Sourcing Services Pakistan, TEXLYNX, and NISHAT Group. (The Statesman 2011). Although 
the number of women participants is tiny compared to the thousands of people these companies 
employ, this program has garnered significant good press for Li & Fung.  
Another CSR program sponsored by LiFung Trinity (which is a member of the Fung 
Group) allows employees to take days off in order to participate in community service, modeled 
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after similar programs in other foreign firms. There are a number of service opportunities for 
employees. “The foundation encourages the group's staff to initiate community projects, such as 
beach cleaning and tree planting, by providing them with the resources to undertake activities” 
(Wei 2012). However, LiFung Trinity seems to use these days off to appease newer employees 
who do not get as many vacation days. “The scheme especially targets new colleagues who have 
fewer holidays in their first year of joining the company. They are given two days of community 
service leave a year, while the other staff have one” (Wei 2012). This program seems to deflect 
criticism that the company could receive about new employees receiving less days off and seems 
also to have the added benefit of associating the company with a positive role in local 
communities.  
Li & Fung attempts to distinguish itself as environmentally “responsible.” While  “fewer 
than one in 10 companies listed on the Hang Seng Composite Index publish reports on their 
carbon footprints, in a ‘worrying’ sign of a business sector dragging its heels over global 
warming, a consultancy says” (Kao, 2013), Li and Fung present a contrasting image. Li & Fung, 
CLP, HSBC, and Swire are categorized as “large-capitalization” (LargeCap) companies, of 
which 25% report carbon emissions (compared with 3% of small-capitalization firms). Li & 
Fung appears to report their carbon emissions regularly and makes this information available to 
the public. On their website, they advertise measures the company has implemented to reduce its 
carbon footprint. The website states, “[r]educing our carbon footprint and improving our carbon 
intensity through the use of cleaner and more efficient energy and fuel sources and equipment, 
will remain at the top of our agenda for our own operations and for those of our suppliers” (Li & 
Fung 2013). Rather than a response to any explicit external pressure, Li and Fung’s awareness of 
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their carbon footprint and environmental impact is apparently related to cost savings, a motive 
which they do not hide in their report  
 
Recognition for CSR Programs 
Li & Fung has received recognition for their CSR work and has been a member of a 
number of different CSR initiatives. They are a participant in the United Nation’s Global 
Compact Initiative and a member of Business for Social Responsibility, which is an international 
US based non-profit organization. In 2008, Li & Fung joined the Business for Social 
Responsibility Clean Cargo Working Group (CCWG) and implemented voluntary environmental 
management guidelines. In 2006, Li & Fung became a member of Supplier Ethical Data 
Exchange (SEDEX), which is an organization that uses technology to maintain and share data on 
labor practices in the supply chain. Since 2002, Li & Fung became a member of the FTSE4Good 
Index Series from UK’s FTSE Group due to its high CSR standards.  
 
Role in Walmart’s Alliance 
The Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety is a non-binding agreement amongst North 
American apparel companies, retailers, and brands to improve safety in Bangladeshi ready-made 
garment factories (Alliance 2014a). When the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety formed in 
2014, Li & Fung was a founding member of the Advisory Board.  Along with WRAP, CARE 
USA, Institute for Women, Peace and Security at Georgetown University, and the Bangladesh 
Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association, Rick Darling of Li and Fung sits on the 
Board of Advisors for the Alliance agreement. The Board of Advisors serves to “help guide the 
Alliance as it tracks implementation and progress against its aggressive goals, which include 
inspecting 100 percent of Alliance garment factories by July 2014, implementing a 
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comprehensive worker training program and helpline, and providing remedial support for 
factories to address safety issues” (Business Wire 2014; Alliance 2014b). Although Li & Fung 
“support[s] the European-based Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh” (Li & Fung 
2013), they say they have not signed onto the Accord because they say, they are not a brand. We 
note that the $1.3 billion revenue of Global Brands, in which they have a controlling interest, is a 
collection of brands (Global Brands Group 2014b). 
The Accord, in contrast to the Alliance, is contractually binding, includes mandatory 
worker voice in safety and inspections, and extends rights of adjudication in both Bangladeshi 
and firms’ home nation courts  (Accord on Fire and Building Safety In Bangladesh 2014). 
 
Li & Fung Code of Conduct and Factory Standards 
Li & Fung maintains their own “Code of Conduct and Business Ethics” as well as a 
“Code of Conduct for Suppliers” which are used in quarterly inspections by their Risk 
Management and Sustainability Committee (Li & Fung 2012; Li & Fung 2014d). Their Code of 
Conduct and Business Ethics covers the following topics in detail (Li & Fung 2012a):  
● Conflicts of Interest 
● Anti-Corruption 
● Accurate Financial Information and Records 
● Insider Trading on Company Securities 
● Supplier Code of Conduct 
● Protection and Use of Company Information and Assets 
● Accurate Reporting on Company Information 
● Relationships with Stakeholders 
● Product Quality and Safety 
● Human and Labor Rights, and Fair and Equal Treatment 
● Harassment 
● Corporate Political Activity 
● Environmental Protection 
● Workplace Safety and Violence 
● Contribution to Community 
● Reports of Concerns and Misconduct 
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Li & Fung’s policies on each of these topics are available through their sustainability 
resource center’s website and offers resources, updated industry information, and training 
schedules for vendors around the world (Li & Fung 2014e). Also publicly available is a supplier 
compliance manual that outlines how to meet these codes of conduct for suppliers (Li & Fung 
2012b). They also provide tutorials for critical and major issues. Training modules on preventing 
human trafficking, improving conditions, human resources management, meeting local legal 
standards and export security requirements are available, as well as occupational safety and 
health tool kits, suggestions for sustainability, and videos by the Fung Academy on fire safety, 
electrical safety, managing working hours, and manufacturing excellence (Li & Fung 2014e).  
 
Response to Tazreen Factory Fire  
Prior to the Rana Plaza disaster of April 2014, whose aftermath took place as we were 
completing this report, the Tazreen Factory Fire – also in Bangladesh – was among the most 
shocking industrial fire/mortality incidents of the recent period. One hundred twelve lives were 
lost in that fire. Li & Fung acknowledged their business with the factory and expressed their 
condolences to the families of the victims. They were among the first corporations to compensate 
families of injured and perished workers. Li & Fung offered to work with the government and 
other third parties to improve safety, but interestingly turned attention to government primacy.  
After the Tazreen fire, Li & Fung waited for the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and 
Exporters Association (BGMEA) to award money to the families of victims so that Li & Fung   
could match it. They followed through and matched the 100,000 taka awarded to the family of 
every victim, as well as setting up an education fund for the children of victims through the Fung 
Foundation (Khan 2012).  
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This type of CSR, which is above and beyond competitors, may prevent negative media 
attention; amid the media uproar after the Tazreen disaster, not a single source directly 
demanded that Li & Fung make payment or implicated them negatively. After the Tazreen 
factory fire, Human Rights Watch reported the amount awarded to these families was insufficient 
(US Official News 2013), but the negative attention was not focused on Li & Fung. Criticism 
tended to be placed on the government, local factory management, and the Western brands, 
leaving Li & Fung out of the discussion. The Clean Clothes Campaign, centered in Amsterdam, 
one of the most outspoken activist groups relating to garment factory workers’ rights, did not 
focus on middlemen sourcing companies. They calculated that compensation to workers should 
have totaled US $5.7 million, but that the debt should be “shared between the factory owner, 
retailers, the BGMEA, and the government” (US Official News 2013). Instead of criticism, Li & 
Fung’s reputation actually appeared to benefit from the disaster, as they were acknowledged for 
going above and beyond what a typical corporation would do in the same situation. Their 
apparent CSR strategy of taking action before public pressure is applied is consistent with their 
environmental policies (notably regarding their carbon emissions reports), implying a coherent 
approach. 
Li & Fung has, consequent to its media and crisis response strategies avoided becoming a 
target of Global North “naming and shaming”  but has instead attempted – with some 
justification – looked to government policies and actions as central to accident prevention. 
William Fung pointed to what he believed must be the role of the government. He commented “it 
was up to the authorities to enforce the laws on safety standards” (Cheung 2013). This is an 
indication that the corporation, although working with the government, would rather place blame 
on government rather than change their own practices. Fung said “[o]ur company has hired many 
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inspectors to examine fire safety facilities in factories in Bangladesh where we source products. 
However, there is not much we can do. It is still up to the authorities to enforce safety standard in 
factory buildings and there are problems with implementation of laws" (Cheung 2013). 
Although Li & Fung artfully attempts to deflect blame from themselves, executives at Li 
& Fung have acknowledged that better working conditions may lead to better business. With 
severe factory disasters happening in the past two years, executives think there is a growing 
consciousness in customers. Bruce Rockowitz said: "What's happened now - what's going on in 
Bangladesh - I think people are much more hypersensitive. I think it's going to improve the 
industry" (MacKinnon and Strauss 2013). If Li & Fung is moving into branding themselves, the 
non-binding CSR they have articulated may help their image. For example, “Li & Fung, the 
buying agent for retailers including Wal-Mart Stores Inc. and Target Corp., said it is setting up a 
new unit to provide buyers and factories with consulting services, financing and insurance to 
bolster compliance with safety codes” (Chu 2014).  Rick Darling stated that Li & Fung is a good 
company to offer the services, because "[a]s the leading global supply chain company, we have 
responsibility to engage more fully and attempt to speed up and expand the safety process 
improvements that have taken place” (Chu 2014). Li & Fung’s Vendor Support Services -- a 
project to monitor factories, headed by William Fung himself -- began in March 2014 and is 
scheduled to take about three years. The initiative could potentially extend to 15,000 factories in 
46 countries (Chu 2014).   
 
Critical Analysis of CSR and Influence in Government  
The positive media attention garnered from Li & Fung’s CSR programs in communities 
(as and factories may contribute to Li & Fung’s public stature and influence with the Chinese 
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government. The Fung Business Intelligence Centre and Li & Fung executives that sit on civic 
and government committees seem to have a strong voice in government and a role in China’s 
future economic goals.  
The Fung Business Intelligence Centre makes reports that appear to have influence over 
governmental policies. For example, the Centre released a report in 2013 with a “plan which 
promotes development among the eastern, central, and western regions is the country's first 
national scheme for domestic trade and is set to become the blueprint for the sector” (Soh 2013). 
The report also included other topics deemed important such as “government policies and 
initiatives aimed at boosting domestic consumption and the regulation of online retail shopping” 
(Soh 2013). Li and Fung’s strategic overviews, widely available through the Centre website are 
similar to the kinds of think-tank issue-framing that sociologists like William Domhoff have 
called the “policy-planning process” within a policy-planning network. The ties between the 
Centre and the government could lead to an influence that ultimately benefits Li & Fung.  For 
example, “[w]ith Beijing assisting local companies through policies and initiatives, the advice 
given by the Fung Business Intelligence Centre for foreign commercial companies was to focus 
on their core competencies by differentiating themselves in the retail market through branding 
and location” (Soh 2013). The relationship between the Fung Business Intelligence Centre and 
the government could potentially help Li & Fung if the government implements their 
suggestions.  
In Hong Kong, the Economic Development Commission was created in January 2013 “to 
advise the government on the direction of its overall strategy to improve economic growth” (Nip 
2013). This commission consists of 26 members and four active groups that focus on transport, 
manufacturing, tourism, among other aspects of the economy. This commission appears to have 
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influence in the government’s plans. As “Commission member and Ocean Park chairman Allan 
Zeman said the government showed a determination to plan for the next 10 to 20 years” (Nip 
2013). The commission has businessmen that have been in their respective industries for a long 
time (such as Victor Fung, who sits as a chairman) and undoubtedly have a stake in the future of 
Chinese industrial policy. Zeman further commented: “The government used to be hands off 
[but] now, like Singapore, it is showing quite a strong leadership" (Nip 2013). Zeman also 
mentioned the commission will attempt address social problems, such as the aging population as 
well. It is possible that as chairman, Victor Fung will use the commission to promote plans that 
to benefit both a thriving middle class in China and his business.  
 
Contradictions 
In his speech to the Century 21 Club in 2011 Victor Fung most explicitly laid out the Li 
and Fung strategy (Fung 2011). Breaking up supply chains into small pieces (yarn, buttons, 
textile, sewing, etc.);  sourcing from multiple plants; following lower price labor away from 
rising areas (e.g., coastal China to the interior; from China to Vietnam); working from contract 
(with a brand or client) to contract. This is a strategy of dispersion.  From the perspective of 
factory owners the pressure is constant. The next season’s contract is always at stake; this 
season’s margin is as narrow as such a major client as Lin and Fung can make it.   
Among the competitive advantages Li and Fung brings to the complex world of global 
commodity chain sourcing is their mastery of the information technology that makes possible the 
management and tracking of the minute breakdown of the design, production and distribution 
flows. Implied too is the advantage proffered by of their network of thousands of local 
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employees with local and personal knowledge of large, small and medium enterprises throughout 
China and Asia. 
With a strategy of dispersion and short-term contracts why would a factory owner have a 
motivation to invest in safety or in adequate worker pay? Pressure from buyers (Li and Fung) 
might motivate some such compliance, but only at the expense of shrinking margins and loss of 
other customers.   
This may be why Li and Fung seems to call for more government regulation of safety and 
minimum wage compliance – they will continue to find the least cost combination of their supply 
chains. Unless ALL buyers are subject to the same – improved and effective – regulatory 
conditions, the logic of the Li and Fung strategy of dispersion means that their competitive 
advantage will continue to encourage them to seek out factories that court with disaster. Since Li 
and Fung’s concentrated sourcing expertise is in Asia, they operate everywhere in governmental 
regimes which are weak or so pro-owner that no such regulation takes place.  
Contrast the Li and Fung strategy of dispersion with a strategy that supports safety and 
decent wages for workers. One version of this is the Worker Rights Consortium Designated 
Supplier strategy: “Licensees are required to pay a price to suppliers commensurate with the 
actual cost of producing under applicable labor standards, including payment of a living wage, 
and they are required to provide their supplier factories with long-term contracts, ensuring that 
factories participating in the program receive sufficient orders to remain financially viable” 
(Worker Rights Consortium 2012).  
Li and Fung talks the talk, but it does not walk the walk. And their own documents 
demonstrate the contradiction.  
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A Note on Strategy and Vulnerability 
Li and Fung have been visible to management strategists for well over a decade:  despite 
the difficulties caused by the Great Recession they are large, respected and increasingly well-
known.  And they are ambitious.  The creation of Global Brands is a bid to create their own 
Western style Brand Jobber Conglomerate. And their sourcing business is now so large that it is 
almost impossible to hide.  Visibility yields vulnerability in a cyber-world.  The process of 
ethical challenge and brand-shaming can make Li and Fung extremely vulnerable just as Gap and 
Nike have been made vulnerable – despite their heroic efforts at reputation rescue.    
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